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We consider a model in which the principal-agent relation between inside
shareholders and the management a¤ects the …rm value. We study the e¤ect of
…nancing the project with risky debt in changing the incentive for a risk-neutral
shareholder (the principal) to implementthe project-value maximizing contract.
We show the conditions under which leverage generates agency costs in terms
of an ex-ante reduction of the …rm value. The result also implies that the
optimal remuneration structure includes “low-incentive” bonus when the …rm
is highly leveraged. This ine¢ciency does not arise when the the agent is paid
with shares of the …rm. We can then conclude that the use of debt is e¤ective
as a commitment device to implement higher operative performance only if it
is accompanied with a compensation policy based on shares remuneration.
JEL Classi…cation: G13, G32.
Keywords: capital structure, managerial incentives, agency costs.
1 Introduction
Since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature has analyzed the role
of ownership structure for the selection of projects. Various sources of agency costs
have been characterized, where these costs are de…ned as the reduction of the value
of the …rm due to incentives to deviate from the optimal rule of selecting all projects
with positive net-present-value.
In this paper we address the relevance of capital structure for e¢ciency, and more
speci…cally, we study the conditions under which the use of high leverage is e¤ective
to improve ex-post e¢ciency. We focus our attention on the principal-agent relation
between the owner of the …rm (or a reference shareholder) and the management, who
will be responsible for the operational activity of the …rm.
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1The …nancial structure of the …rm does not a¤ect directly the payo¤s of the invest-
ment in the Modigliani-Miller (1958) paradigm of irrelevance of capital structure; but
it obviously changes the distribution of property rights over the …rm. Shareholders
and debtholders will share the future cash ‡ows generated by the project in a way
proportional to their claims. What happens if a big shareholder, or some of them,
can negotiate contracts with the management in the presence of moral hazard? In
this paper we show that changing the …nancial structure changes the “incentive to
give incentive” by the shareholders-principals. This real e¤ect in‡uences the payo¤s
of the project, as well as their probability distribution. Therefore, these payo¤s are
not exogenous to the distribution of property rights, and the value of the …rm changes
with its capital structure.
We can show that …nancing the investment opportunities with risky debt reduces
the ex-ante value of the …rm, by inducing a future choice of contract that is subop-
timal. If the cost of outside equity is considered negligible, and without corporate
taxation, then the optimal capital structure involves not to issue risky debt at all.
We also get some implications on the managerial incentives as a function of the cap-
ital structure: in highly leveraged …rms, managerial compensation should be rather
“‡at”, insuring the management against bankruptcy. The negative relation between
leverage and compensation has been observed by Smith and Watts (1992) especially
in …rms with low ratio between growth opportunities and assets-in-place value, where
managers are broadly remunerated with traditional monetary wages.
This ine¢ciency does not arise if the management is compensated with shares of
the …rm. We can then conclude that high leverage is e¤ective in improving perfor-
mance only if it is linked to a reorganization of managerial compensation scheme,
centered on share-plans. Empirical evidence on LBOs (Denis (1994)) and Baker
and Wruck (1989)) shows that performance increased after leveraged recapitaliza-
tions only when the executive compensation was restructured and based on shares or
stock-options plans.
Up to now, the e¤ects of human capital e¤ort on the payo¤ structure of projects
have been largely neglected in the literature studying the determinants of capital
structure. Research has focused on asymmetric information between insiders and
outsiders (Myers and Majluf, 1988, among many other signalling models), managerial
discretion (Stulz, 1990, Grossman and Hart, (1983b)), or other forms of managerial
ine¢ciency (Jensen, 1986). Only Innes (1990) has shown the optimality of debt con-
tract for …nancing an entrepreneur who is wealth constrained and subject to limited
liability. His result relies on the debt as a commitment device that the entrepreneur
imposes on himself as an agent to implement a higher e¤ort. Only in this paper we
…nd the link between the shareholder payo¤ function, that is dependent on the capital
structure, and the e¤ort choice by individuals who are called to work on the project,
which is underlying our results.
What is lacking, from our point of view, in the Innes’ paper is the intrinsic moral
hazard problem of agency relationships. Innes assumes that the entrepreneur is ac-
tually driving the project realization, and he assumes then the double role of the
principal and the agent. In most of modern …rms, and a fortiori in corporations,
this is not the case. Even in small, project-based …rms, the principal, the owner
2of the …rm, relies on the collaboration of (potentially) many agents in pursuing his
production activity.
The model is a very stylized example of projects value and incentive structure. A
principal proposesacomplete contract toan agent, whochoosesthe utility-maximizing
e¤ort toimplement accordingtoit. Exogenousuncertainty isa¤ected by this principal-
agent relationship since highere¤ort increases the probability of getting higher results.
The cost of the contract will also a¤ect the …nal payments of the project, in a very
simple way: higher payments to executives will reduce pro…ts and hence the …nal
value of the stock. At the end of the period the …rm is liquidated. Dividends choice
is then not strategical. This allows a substantial simpli…cation with respect to the
important issue of dividends as signals of higher valuable information about the …rm
(as in John and Williams (1985)). Moreover, it avoids any strategy of manipulation
of the market via dividends policy by executives. Ownership and capital structure
of the …rm are exogenously given at the moment of contract negotiation: we analyze
separately the case in which the …rm is …nanced with riskless debt and the one where
risky debt is issued. The capital structure is chosen at a precedent period, t = ¡1,
and prior to this the decision about investing or not in the project is taken.
For simplicity we suppose that the all these choices are common knowledge be-
tween the investors in the …rm: therefore, the principal has no informational advantage
given his position (anyway, in many regulations of existing markets, trading on these
advantages would be forbidden). Also, we do not consider any di¤erence in the inter-
ests of the principal and other outside shareholders (who do not in‡uence the choice
of contracts) or the market. Under these assumptions, for very high debt over equity
ratio, the contract which maximizes the market value of equities provides a lower
incentive-bonus than the one which maximizes the total market value of the …rm.
The main intuition of the result is simple. In the reference situation where the …rm
is entirely …nanced with equity, the principal, chooses the contract which maximizes
the ex-ante value of the …rm. When risky debt is issued, his payo¤ (as well as the
payo¤ of all other shareholders) becomes convex in the future pro…t realizations.
Then, he will not pay entirely the costs of the managerial remuneration: the …xed
part, that is due in all the contingencies, is actually paid by the debtholders. As an
opposite e¤ect, he will have an incentive to increase the remuneration bonus in the
good states in order to increase the likelihood of that states.
If the …rm is highly leveraged, the …rst e¤ect will prevail, as economic intuition
suggests: why should the principal, who is going to enjoy positive pro…ts only in a
few states, give up a substantial part of them in the forms of high incentive bonuses
to the management since most of the advantage of the higher e¤ort will be cashed-in
by the debtholders?
However, if the level of debt is lower, the second e¤ect could prevail, according to
the characteristics of the probability distribution over the states of future payo¤s of
the project as a function of managerial e¤ort.
In any case, an ine¢ciency arises since the principal does not internalize all the
bene…ts (in the …rst case) or all the costs (in the second) of an increased managerial
bonus. This reduces the …rm value. Risky debt does not provoke ine¢ciency if
the managerial compensation scheme is based on shares (or share-options), a result
3analogous to Innes (1990).
We give then a rationale for implementing remuneration schemes based on man-
agerial participation in …rm capital when the …rm is highly levered (ex. in LBOs).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. In section
3 wegive the general result of irrelevance of …nancial structure . In section 4 we discuss
our assumptions and give an alternative interpretation of the model as well as some
possible extensions. Section 5 presents analytical example where the agency cost of
debt is quanti…ed and the new contract in the case of leveraged …rm is characterized.
Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix we collect the proofs of the basic lemmas.
2 The model
Considerathree-periodsmodel of a…rmwhosevalue dependson independent projects.
The value of the assets already in place is commonly known to insiders and investors,
and does not a¤ect the value of future projects: without loss of generality we nor-
malize it to zero1. The …rm is considering the investment decision in a new project,
whose returns are independent of assets-in-place, and the related choice of project-
…nancing2.
The choice of investment is taken at date t = ¡1, and at the same time the
…nancial structure is decided. We assume that the project earnings randomly realize
at some future time t = 1: we denote this random variable with e y = fys;s 2 -g
where - represents the space of possible gross pro…ts level of the project, and it is
assumed to be a closed and compact interval [s;s]; the project does not mature any
earnings in time zero. After the realization of e y it can be liquidated.
The main shareholder of the …rm chooses whether to invest in the project, and,
in the a¢rmative case, how to …nance the investment. In he invests, he has to
pay an amount I > 0 at date -1, and he has the choice of …nancing it with the
issue of new equities or with debt. We are not interested in situations in which the
principal is interested in carrying out investment projects for empire-building reasons
(as in Stulz (1990)) if they are not pro…table: hence, the choice of implementing or
not the project will maximize the share value, and the principal can be seen as a
representative shareholder who is endowed with decision-making power concerning
the particular project3.
If the project is implemented, he delegates the running of it to a manager: in terms
of standard principal-agent models, the owner-(inside)shareholder is the principal and
1Alternatively, and perhaps more easily, our …rm is just to be established and it will be a one-
project …rm.
2We focus on a problem of project-…nancing, i.e. the project, if implemented, will be …nanced
as a stand-alone entity. The assumption is required since we want to avoid the link between human
capital e¤ort devoted to the succes of a particular project and the one required for ruling the assets-
in-place: considering a more complicated model of moral-hazard would complicate the analysis,
introducing multi-dimensional e¤ort choices.
3Alternatively, he can be considered as the unique owner of the …rm, or as the CEO of it; in this
case, it is crucial that he owns shares of the …rm.
4the manager is the agent. The principal is assumed not to be able to monitor the
manager’s actions, but he will be able to observe the outcome of these actions, and
in particular the realization of the project’s pro…t at t = 1.
The principal, if he decides to invest in the project, …rst chooses the …nancial
structure, and then, at time t = 0, proposes a state-contingent, complete contract
ws to the agent specifying the payment the latter will get for any realized state of
the world at time one. Notice that the …nancial decision anticipates the choice of the
contract submitted to the agent.
The agent, after being told the contract, will choose the e¤ort a maximizing his
utility. The choice of e¤ort lies in a continuous interval a 2 [0;a]. The agent su¤ers
a cost for his e¤ort that makes a potential con‡ict with the interest of the principal.
Formally, his utility function U(a;ws) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
which depends both on his action a and the remuneration earned (that we denote
here as a state-dependent variable for sake of generality, but it could be a constant).
Assumption 1. The function U(a;ws) can be written as
R
- u(ws)g(sja)ds¡c(a)
where c(a) is twice di¤erentiable and convex in a.
We suppose that the principal is risk-neutral, and hence he evaluates only the net
pro…ts of the project (gross pro…ts ys minus the payment to the manager ws), while
the agent is risk-averse. If the principal is able to fully diversify the risk of the project
on the …nancial markets, then his neutrality towards the risk follows; since we will
suppose he has free access on the credit market, (and also on the …nancial markets),
and that markets are complete, this seems to us a quite reasonable assumption.
The compensation to the agent is assumed to be senior to any debt claim issued
by the principal at time zero to …nance the project; hence, all these claims are entitled
to payment only if the agent has received his wage ws:
We ignore problems of renegotiation of the agent contract, since the agent will be
entitled to his compensation with priority to others claim-holders and since we assume
completeness of the contract. Once it is decided whether to invest in the project, and
the way of …nancing that investment, the principal will propose the contract that
maximizes his claims value, i.e. the value of the shares on the project. The interests
of other shareholders are perfectly aligned to the interests of our principal, and then
there is no additional cost of outside equity …nancing4. Moreover, since the new
project represents a growth opportunity for the …rm it is reasonable that its value
is accurately monitored by the market, and if the value of the assets-in-place has
been released (in order to avoid the adverse selection problem pointed out by Myers
and Majluf (1984)) the cost of outside equity …nancing can be considered exogenous.
We suppose also that the information about the project returns and the contract is
commonly known by market participants.
The net payo¤ of the project if state s realizes is then ys ¡ ws. We assume no
discount and market completeness and for simplicity all the claims are priced under
the historical probability measure g(s;a). The expected present value of the project,
evaluated at time zero, is then Eg(s;a)[ys ¡ ws jF0] where F0 is the information set
4Of course, this is restrictive in terms of design of optimal capital structure: as Jensen and
Meckling (1976) point out, there are incentive problems associated with …nancement via outside
equity (see also the discussion of this point in section 5).
5at time zero that includes the contract stipulated and the …nancial structure, and
g(s;a) is the probability distribution on -. Let the states s ordered according to ys:
the worst state s is the one where y is minimum, and so on. The e¤ort of the agent
a¤ects the probability distribution and the likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing
(MLRP): the ratio
ga(sja)
g(sja) ; where ga(sja) =
@g(sja)
@a , is monotonically increasing in s.
In the following we impose a slightly more restrictive assumption on the likelihood
ratio.
Assumption 2. ga(sja) is increasing in s.
Hence, the project’s future cash ‡ows are dependent on the agency relationship
existing between the shareholder-principal and the agent-manager: the latter’s e¤ort
will a¤ect the net pro…ts and their probability distribution, together with exogenous
uncertainty. If we refer to traditional theories of capital structure the main di¤erence
of our model is that here the cash ‡ows depend on a contractual relation since human
capital is involved in the process of production. The distribution, and the absolute
value, of the project’s cash ‡ows is not exogenous to the distribution of property
rights if these property rights a¤ect the optimal contract for the principal: he is, in
fact, the only one entitled to write contracts for the management.
The decision about taking or not the project relies only on its expected net present
value, Eg(sja)[ys ¡wsjF0]¡I. If this latter is positive, the principal decides to invest
in the project, otherwise he does not. If the principal invests, the total payo¤ to
date-zero claim-holders will be R = Eg(sja)[ys ¡ ws jF0] ¡ I.
If the principal is wealth constrained (the wealth he invests in the project W < I),
he can alternatively raise the funds necessary for the project investment in the stock
market, issuing new shares, or issuing debt claims. Once the necessary funds have
been raised, he will negotiate the contract with the agent and then the production
activity will start.
To begin with, suppose the principal can …nd on the stock market the funds
necessary to take the project issuing new equities. If he invests I at period zero and
proposes the agent contractual state-contingent payments of ws, the project is an
asset worth ys at time t = 1, and the value of equity will be ys¡ws if state s realizes.
If the investment is not made, no additional shares are issued, and the project is
worthless (as well as the …rm).





In this case, the incentive of the principal coincides exactly with the incentive of
outside equity-holders. In fact, the objective for both is to maximize the value of the
project with the right choice of contract to propose to the manger-agent. In doing
this, the principal faces the standard trade-o¤ of moral hazard problems between
incentive and insurance purposes. The problem for the principal, once investment
has been paid and equities have been issued, reads as follows:
max
(ws;a(ws))s2-




s:t: a(ws) is the e¤ort implemented by A given the contract ws
(P1)
6where ® representsthe fraction of principal’sequities overthe total amount of equities,
i.e. ® = W
I since the equities are priced under the martingale measure g(sja)5.
More precisely, we can express the constraint of (P1) describing the action-choice
problem of the agent. If he has an outside option of obtaining an utility U working




- u(ws)g(sja)ds ¡ c(a)
given ws
(A)
that generates the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints the
principal must satisfy in (P1):
R




- u(ws)g(sjb a)ds ¡ c(b a) (IC)
(1)
Notice that the agent’s objective is not in‡uenced by the capital structure of the
project …nancement since his compensation is senior to the other claims on the payo¤
ys. As immediate corollary of this observation, we can write the optimal choice of
the agent, a, as a function of only the contract payments ws. The principal will then
take into account this in solving his maximization problem for the optimal contract.
Suppose now P decides to …nance the investment issuing new debt6. Let D < I
be the face value of the debt issued, and assume that the proceeds of the debt issue
are used to reduce the required initial equity investment. Then, consider the problem
faced by the principal once the debt has been issued.
The optimal contract solves
max
(ws;a(ws))s2-
Eg(sja)[maxfys ¡ ws ¡ D;0gjF0] =
R
-(maxfys ¡ ws ¡ D;0g)g(sja)ds
s:t: a(ws) is the e¤ort implemented by A given the contract ws
(P2)
where the set of constraints is given by (1).
Two observations can be done at this point: …rstly, due to the convexity of the
payo¤ of his equity claims, the principal will have an incentive to increase the volatil-
ity of the project’s payo¤s (see Jensen and Meckling, (1976)). Secondly, these payo¤s
depend on the wage ws in the optimal contract, that should create the right incentives
to the agent. The trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance purposes of the con-
tract has not changed since the problem of the agent is independent of the …nancial
structure. What has changed with the shape of the principal objective function is his
cost to give incentives to the agent in order to make him working harder (and hence
making the good states realization more probable (by MLRP)).
5We assume that the new equity holders rationally take into account the determination of the
optimal contract proposed by the principal to the agent, to evaluate the price of the new issued
equities. In other words, we assume e¢ciency of the …nancial market.
6As we stressed in the introduction, we do not analyze the problem of debt-overhang illustrated
by Myers (1977): in fact, …nancing the project with debt, in this setup, would reduce the value of
the project due to agency costs of debt, since it induces a sub-optimal investment strategy. In fact,
in our model as in Myers (1977) the debt matures after the …rm investment decision is made. In the
following, we will not consider these agency costs of debt.
7Summarizing, the …nancing decision has an e¤ect over the value of the project
if7 the solution of problem (P2) is di¤erent from the solution of (P1). In general,
this will be the case. The main intuition is the following: if risky debt is issued,
the principal is not entirely paying the compensation of the agent in the states with
default; part of it is actually payed by the debtholders. This increases the willingness
of the principal to o¤er an high compensation in the unfavorable states in exchange
of a lower bonus, reducing the incentive structure for the agent. But doing this, the
latter will probably choose to work less hard, reducing the probability of success of
the project. On the other hand, this lower likelihood of good states, where P enjoys
positive pro…ts, is not bene…cial for P. These two contrary e¤ects make the capital
structure relevant for the …rm’s value.
3 Relevance of capital structure and agency cost
of debt
We characterize the solution of our model solving the problems backward in time, i.e.
starting from the agent’s choice of e¤ort. We just recall here that capital markets
are perfect and agent are rational8; information is distributed symmetrically in the
market, in the sense that thestructure of the model is commonly known amongmarket
participants: the optimal contract is then rationally anticipated by all the (potential)
claimholders and their claims are correctly priced under the resulting probability
measure g(sja). Given the contract choice (as a function of the capital structure),
the principal chooses the optimal ratio of debt to equity to …nance the project: this
determines the expected value of the project. Finally, a decision about investing or
not is taken according to the sign of the expected net present value of that project.
3.0.1 Some results of the moral-hazard problem
Unfortunately, the moral-hazard problem between P and A has very weak properties
in a general framework, and then additional assumptions are necessary to give it
some more tractability. As shown by Grossman and Hart (1983) the shape of the
optimal contract in a principal-agent model can be extremely complex. Following
the “…rst-order approach” (Holmstrom (1977)), the condition MLRP is su¢cient to
get monotonicity of the optimal contract. Our assumption 3 (that is stronger than
MLRP) guarantees then the monotonicity of the optimal contract under the “…rst-
order approach”. In this framework, we can furthermore restrict the set of possible
contracts to schemes of the following type:
Assumption 3. The function y(s) is strictly monotone in s once the states
have been appropriately ordinate, and y = y(s). The set of possible contracts is
characterized by two positive parameters ¾;b such that:
ws = ¾ + b(ys ¡y)
7Under our conditions this should be also an “only if” statement.
8We include in the rational behaviour also the assumption of rational expectations.






¾ + b(ys ¡ y)
¢
g(sja)ds ¡ c(a)
and, given the …rst order approach, substitute the (IC) constraint with the …rst-order




0(a) = 0 (2)
From equation (2) one gets the solution a(¾;b). Given assumption 3 we can prove
the following:
Lemma 1. The optimal contract for the principal makes the (IR) constraint
binding.
Proof. If we restrict the set of contracts to the ones described in Assumption
3, the individual rationality constraint for the agent will not be binding if (i) the
principal increases the ‡at wage ¾ keeping the bonus b constant; (ii) he increases b
keeping ¾ constant; (iii) increase the pay in bad states reducing it in the good states.
The …rst deviation has no e¤ect on the incentives for the manager to choose
an higher e¤ort, since the wage ¾ is paid in all future realizations. Hence, this
deviation makes the contract more expensive for P without any bene…ts. The second
can potentially increase the e¤ort, but if this would be pro…table, then the starting
contract would not be optimal. The third deviation is analogous to reducing the
bonus in terms of incentive for A, but is more costly for P. ¥
Since for the principal is always optimal to lower the remuneration until the con-
straint (IR) is binding, the bonus b and the ‡at wage ¾ will be functionally related
by the equation (IR); we can write ¾ = ¾(b): once the bonus is …xed, ¾ is obtained




(The proofs of this and the following lemmas are in the appendix).
Increasing the bonus b will also change the incentive for A to implement his e¤ort,
since it changes the relative remuneration in good and bad states; on the other hand,
it makes more volatile the wage for the agent: the usual trade-o¤ between insurance
and incentives faced by the principal in moral-hazard models. In the following lemma
we derive the bound on risk-aversion of the agent that makes the e¤ort function a(b)
increasing in the incentive bonus b.




b(¾0(b)+ys¡y), then a0(b) > 0.
Given the properties on the functions a(b) and ¾(b) we can determine a last result
that will be useful in the following. In our setup, the total monetary cost of the
contract for the principal reduces when b is reduced: one dollar less in terms of bonus
remuneration requires an increase of less than one dollar in terms of ¾ to keep the
agent at his reservation utility level.
Lemma 4. Let C =
R s
s wsg(sja)ds; if a0(b) > 0 then C0(b) > 0.
Observation. Notice that Lemmas 1-2-3 and 4 are independent of the …nancing
decision. Since the wage of A is assumed to be a senior claim with respect to debt,
9the agent is completely indi¤erent to the capital structure of the …rm he is working
for. P will anyway reduce his utility to the reservation value U: This property of our
model is crucial to obtain the results, and needs a critical discussion (see section 4).
3.0.2 The principal’s optimal contract as a function of the property rights
distribution
Let V be the equilibrium market value of the project at time zero (when the contract
is negotiated), and VD, VE the values of debt and equities respectively at the same













where D ¸ 0 is the face value of the debt issued.
Suppose …rst the project is entirely …nanced by issuing equities, i. e. D = 09.
Then V = VE. In this case the problem of the principal is (P1), that is equivalent to




s (ys ¡ ws)g(sja)ds
s:t:
R s




s u(ws)g(sjb a)ds ¡ c(b a) (IC)







ys ¡ ¾(b) ¡ b(ys ¡ y)
¢
g(sja)ds





9All what we say about all-equity …nancing is also true for the case that the debt is riskless, i.e.










and no distortions are introduced since maximizing VE is equivalent to maximize V . The capital
structure is then irrelevant for the value of the project.











(ys ¡ y)g(sja)ds (1)
Equation (1) illustrates the marginal costs and bene…t for P of an additional unit
in bonus: on the left-hand side we have the marginal bene…t due to the saving in
¾(b) plus the increased probability of good outcomes due to the higher e¤ort induced;
on the right-hand side the marginal cost of the bonus that has to be paid (equal to
Eg(a)[ys] ¡ y in expected terms given the form of the contract).
This equality characterizes the optimal b, that we denote as b¤
E. b¤
E is a maximum
only if the second derivative
@2V (b¤
E)
@b2 < 0. Notice also that, if we impose global
concavity of V (b), any b 6= b¤
E would reduce the value of the project. Su¢cient
conditions for the concavity of V in b are given in the following lemma (the proof is
in the appendix).
Lemma 6. The function V (b) is concave in b if ¾00(b) ¸ 0; a0(b) < 1; a00(b) ￿ 0.
Financing with risky debt Suppose now the …rm has borrowed funds to …nance
the project with the promised payment D > 0 where D >> ys: The debt issued is
risky since in the contingencies with lowest project payo¤s it will be impossible to
payback D entirely. Moreover, the payment ws has still to be subtracted from the
total amount of resources the debtholders can claim: the credit structure we have
imposed makes the debtholders paying the agent remuneration in the bad states.
This will change the principal’s contract decision: the marginal costs and bene-
…ts for P, as a shareholder, are di¤erent from the one described in equation (1). P






maxfys ¡ ws ¡ D;0gg(sja)ds
s:t:
R s




s u(ws)g(sjb a)ds ¡ c(b a) (IC)






ys ¡ ¾(b) ¡ b(ys ¡y) ¡ D
¢
g(sja)ds





The …rst-order condition gives, under the Assumptions of lemma 6, the necessary and
su¢cient conditions for the new maximum, b¤(D), describing the marginal costs and














11We can point out three di¤erences from the F.O.C. (1):
(i) since P as a shareholder is not actually paying the wage of A in states s <
b s(D;b) the marginal bene…ts from a reduction in ¾(b) reduces;
(ii) since the equity payo¤ is positive only in statess > b s(D;b) the marginal bene…t
from an increased bonus through an increased e¤ort a is reduced to that states only;
(iii) the marginal cost of an increased b is also relevant only in the states where
P is actually paying the agent.
The three e¤ects together imply both a reduction of marginal bene…ts and costs
of an increase of b for P: It is not clear then which e¤ect prevails, and it is not a priori
sure if b¤(D) is higher than b¤
E.
What are the basic e¤ects that could induce P to propose a di¤erent bonus when
risky debt has been issued? On one hand, his payo¤ is positive only in the favorable
states, that would increase his willingness to increase b. On the other hand, he is
actually paying b entirely as a shareholder (since b is paid just when shares are “in-
the-money”), and the bene…cial of an higher e¤ort is not completely internalized by
his payo¤: higher e¤ort is also increasing the debt value VD. We see that these two
forces do not trivially vanish in general.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-2-3 the choice of optimal contract for the
principal generically depends on the distribution of property rights over the project’s
payo¤ whenever risky debt has been issued. If
R s
b s ga(sja¤
E)ds > 0, for high values of
D the optimal contract bonus is lower than b¤
E.
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E)ds = 0 (4)































that is decreasing in D if
R s
b s ga(sja¤
E)ds > 0 since a0(b¤
E) > 0. Then two situations
are possible:
1) sgn[(3)] < 0 for any D;
2) it exists a e D : sgn[(3)] < 0 for D > e D and sgn[(3)] > 0 for D < e D:




@b < 0 we can say that b¤(D) < b¤
E. ¥
The result has a very straightforward intuition, even if its statement seems to be
a bit complicate. Take the case where D is very high. Increasing b would shift the
probability distribution towards the right. Now, an increase of b is very costly for
P, and is going to be bene…cial for debtholders also. This situation can be described
with the following words of P: “Why should I make my management work as crazy,
that would cost me incredibly whenever we will have success in repaying our debts, if
most of the advantage is probably going to the bankers?” The shareholders, in other
words, do not internalize fully the bene…ts of an increased bonus: their “incentive to
give incentives” is reduced.
If the leverage is much lower, things could change. Now, P has probably an
interest in promising high incentives in case of good realizations since he enjoys most
of the bene…t of a shift towards the right of the probability distribution g(sja): One
could ask why we observe an ine¢ciency in terms of ex-ante value loss of the project
even when the bonus is increased, as the e¤ort. This is due to the fact that bonus
higher than b¤
E are too costly, and they reduce the overall value V : with respect to
the optimal choice, b¤
E the …rm is now paying the management “too much” in order
to push them over-working with respect to the e¢cient level.
We can conclude stressing one main implications of proposition 1. An “over-
exposure” in terms of debt of the …rm produces a contract scheme for the management
that is much more ‡at that in the case of full equity …nancement. A moderate leverage
should be coupled with a very incentive-oriented compensation structure.
3.1 Optimal capital structure and the agency cost of debt
We can now solve the model backward analyzing the choice of capital structure. At
time t = ¡1 P has to decide in which way to …nance the project, if he did undertake





Unfortunately, the solution of this problem is practically impossible, since we are not
able to characterize completely the function b¤(D)11. The only possible observation we
10Notice that we postpone the choice of capital structure to the one of investment in order to
avoid the ine¢ciency due to “debt-overhang” illustrated by Myers (1977).
11See section 5 for a completely solved analytical example.
13can make is that, whenever P chooses to issue risky debt, there will be an incentive
for him to switch from the contract b¤
E; but then, the total value of the project, R s
s (ys ¡ws)g(sja)ds, will be less than its all-equity value V (b¤
E). This can be de…ned
as an “agency cost” of risky debt (following Jensen and Meckling (1976)): if P is
wealth-constrained but he has full access to credit markets, he will not be able to
…nance the projects whose cost I at time t = ¡1 is higher than V (b¤(D)), while
without the obligation of issuing risky debt he could a¤ord all the projects with
I ￿ V (b¤
E). This is due to the fact that P will not have the incentive anymore to
negotiate with its management the contract that is actually value-maximizing. The
optimal policy of P as a shareholder, in choosing the capital structure, is then to
issue no risky debt at all. Since issuing risky debt reduces the market value of the
project, also VE(D), the market value of equities, will be maximum when D is riskless.
This conclusion is opposite to the one of Innes (1990): this is due to the fact that
in our model the principal is a di¤erent individual from the agent. Our contract is
not a commitment to work done with ourselves, but is a standard employer-employee
contract.
Naturally, we are aware that in reality our result about the optimal capital struc-
ture holds only if the agency costs of outside equities (in the terms of Jensen and
Meckling (1976)) are smaller than the ones we have described here12. In the reality
it is not true that the cost of outside equity is zero, as pointed out by many theories
on agency costs between managers and shareholders (Stulz, 1990)), asymmetric infor-
mation (Myers and Majluf (1984)), IPO’s (Rock (1986)): but it could be that “Debt
may be the lesser evil ” (Myers, 1977). In that case, our model gives a rationale for
project-owners to go public whenever they are wealth-constrained even if they have
free and unlimited access to the credit market.
If P is actually forced to issue risky debt, then this will be costly. Writing the





that is less than D. The cost of debt capital, D
VD(b¤(D)) ¡1 is positive; notice also that
it could be the case that increasing borrowing reduces the debt value VD(b¤(D)), so
that a rational credit rationing for P could arise: creditors could stop to borrow P
money at some amount D¤ such that VD(b¤(D¤)) is maximum even if they would be
o¤ered an higher interest rate.
4 Discussion
In this section we critically analyze some of the assumptions of the model and draw
some more implications of the results described up to now.
12See also the discussion in section 5.
144.1 Shares plans for the agent
One important critic to our setup is that in reality is often observed that management,
at least at a the highest levels, is rewarded with stocks of the …rm (or with stock-
options plans). The rationality of this compensation schemes is to align the incentives
of the management with the ones of shareholders: in other words, compensation
via stocks (or stock-options) should reduce the role of the incentive compatibility
constraint, guaranteeing that the agent will always pick the e¤ort that maximizes the
value of equities, since his wealth will depend on it. Theoretical (Innes (1990), Jensen
(1986), Hart and Moore (1995)) and empirical literature (Smith and Watts (1992),
Denis (1994), Baker and Wruck (1989)) observes that leverage is in this case an useful
device that commits the management to implement an e¢cient choice of e¤ort, that
produces an increase in operational performance of the …rm. Solving our model when
the principal pays the agent with shares of the project we reach the same conclusion:
the critical assumption that guides the e¤ect of debt over performance is then the
seniority of the agent compensation.
Suppose some risky debt D has been issued in the …rst period and assume for
simplicity that it exists a state s < b s < s such that D = yb s
13. Suppose also for
simplicity that the set of feasible contracts is composed just by shares remuneration14,
i.e.
ws = maxfq(ys ¡ D);0g
where the quota q < 1 of shares is transferred from the principal portfolio to the
agent15. If we now write the problem of the agent we realize that this is not anymore










u(q(ys ¡ D))g(sja)ds ¡ c(a)
given q:
By …rst order approach this can be replaced with its …rst-order condition, and hence
by a function a(q). The (IR) constraint implicitly …xes a lower bound for the quota




b s u(q(ys ¡ D))g(sja)ds ¡ c(a) ¸ U
) q ¸ qIR
The problem of the principal for a given capital structure is then to choose the
stock sharing (q;1¡q) that is equity-value maximizing, under the constraint of being
13If the payo¤s ys are not continuous in s we can only be sure that D belongs to an interval
[ysj;ysj+1] where the states have been ordered increasingly in ys. With a continuum of states the
assumption seems rather innocuous.
14Any “mixed regime” where compensation is partly paid in money and partly in shares will
probably combine the two e¤ects.
15We will assume here for simplicity that P is the only shareholder, then he owns the remaining
1 ¡q shares.
15individually rational for the agent; P solves
max
q (1 ¡ q)
R s




The solution of this problem is made complicate by the fact that we should be able
to explicitly check if the (IR) is binding or not: we present in the last section of the
paper an analytical example where this can be done. In general terms we can obtain
the following result (the proof is in the appendix):






ever the agent is remunerated with shares of the …rm the value of the …rm increases
with leverage.
Hence, our model is able to generate the prediction of Innes (1990) when the agent
is made residual claimant, being paid by shares, exactly as in his model. As predicted
by the literature, with share-remuneration the principal indeed aligns the interests of
the management to his own ones. In this case, the trade-o¤ that creates the agency
cost of debt illustrated before disappears, since now the agent is paid only in the
good states, and the principal does not give up some wealth to increase the payo¤ of
debtholders: then leverage works as a commitment device (exactly as in Innes (1990))
to maximize the value of the project, that is now also in the interest of A given his
remuneration via shares. Notice also that the fact that (IR) is binding …nally depends
on reservation utility U, but in a complex way that we are not able to point out in
this general setup.
A second implication of theproposition isalsointeresting: with share-remuneration,
the agent is constrained again to his reservation utility level, but higher leverage will
also imply harder work. Then, giving shares to the management seems to be e¤ective
in implementing an high e¤ort. Whenever problems of monitoring are serious at a
management level, a share-remuneration scheme should be de…nitely preferable for
equityholders. As Smith and Watts (1992) argue, monitoring and evaluation prob-
lems are especially serious in …rms with high growth opportunities and low values
of assets-in-place, where they indeed …nd empirical evidence for a wider use of share
plans for management (independently of the capital structure).
4.1.1 LBOs: when debt is an e¤ective tool to implement e¢ciency
Case studies on leverage buyouts (Denis (1994), Baker and Wruck (1989)) have shown
that this …nancial reorganization often improved performance of the …rm. Since in
LBOs the leverage is dramatically increased, this seems contradictory to the result
of our proposition 1. One usual interpretation of this evidence is that debt is indeed
a good device to increase the value of the …rm. But, as the literature quoted above
observes, in LBOs the management is usually heavily rewarded with shares, and
proposition 2 can therefore explain the phenomenon. A closer look to the empirical
evidence is therefore necessary if we want to understand when debt is really e¤ective
as a value-maximizing instrument. Denis (1994) …nds in a comparative study between
16similar …rms that have been purchased via a LBO that the one where management
compensation plan was focus on participation increased its post-LBO performance
much more than another …rm where management compensation structure was still
based on traditional monetary-bonusscheme. Moreover, he observes that the incentive
structure in this second …rm was not changed even after the very dramatic increase in
leverage due to the LBO. Then, Denis concludes that “lacking the …nancial incentive
of signi…cant managerial equity ownership or the monitoring of a large shareholder,
[...] using leverage to increase e¤ectiveness of internal control systems [...] may be
risky.” Palepu and Wruck (1992) also provides evidence for poor ex-post performance
for defensive leveraged recapitalizations.
4.2 Some other critical points
4.2.1 Seniority of wage
What has been promised on the basis of a legally enforceable contract as remunera-
tion for the management usually has to be paid in priority to all the debt, and not
many objections should arise on this. Unfortunately16 a relevant part of manage-
rial remuneration is usually paid in terms of fringe-bene…ts, other kinds of monetary
and non-monetary bene…ts di¢cult to evaluate quantitatively, stocks of the company,
stock options, or in other forms. For some of these instruments, that typically form
the major part of incentives to management, our assumption on seniority of claim
could be questioned with good reasons. Even if we recognize that the critic has some
valuable background, we think that the monetary component of incentive remuner-
ation is de…nitely predominant, at least to the pure non-monetary aspects (keeping
aside the stock-options that we discuss later).
4.2.2 Cost of outside equities
There are many theoretical studies that prove that the cost of outside equity is not
equal to zero. We certainly do not claim the opposite. We just consider the cost
of outside equity as exogenous to the economic trade-o¤s we illustrate here, and we
“parameterized” it to zero for simplicity. The point that should be discussed is then if
it is reasonable to consider the cost of outside equity independent of the management
incentive structure. If the outside shareholders are not risk-neutral, they will price the
risk of their investment in shares of the project, risk that can be measured with the
volatility of the returns. When P proposes a contract to A this a¤ect this volatility:
di¤erent contracts induce a di¤erent payo¤ structure.
This problem is avoided under the assumption that the pricing rule is risk-neutral,
i.e. the equilibrium pricing measure is g(sja). Using a more sophisticated pricing
kernel would invalidate our assumption, and it would lead to a much more complex
model where both the costs of outside equities and debt are endogenous: we leave
this problem as a further research topic.
16For us, not for the management.
174.2.3 The perfection of capital market.
Who is actually crucial to produce, the principal or the agent? Of course, the agent:
his e¤ort is going to change the project results. This observation leads to a very
sensitive objection: why A cannot borrow and …nance himself the project? The
imperfection on the credit market that we implicitly assume is de…nitely driving all
our results, especially if we compare them with the one in Innes (1990). Innes shows
that the optimal contract from the point of view of a risk-neutral entrepreneur under
limited liability is actually a debt contract, since it commits him to work hard. We
would …nd the same result if our agent A could borrow himself the money necessary to
invest in the project. This is assumed to be not possible for institutional constraints
and then it is necessary the presence of an individual, P, who actually plays no role
in the process of production, but has the necessary access to the credit market. The
ine¢ciency we derive is …nally due to this sub-optimality of the credit market. Any
policy which stimulates the credit for potentially pro…table new projects will increase
the e¢ciency of the …nal allocation.
4.2.4 P as a CEO endowed with stock options
With a simple mathematical observation, we could say that the agency cost of risky
debt isdue to the convexity of P’spayo¤, that makeshimnot to internalize completely
the costs (or the bene…ts) of an increased bonus.
This convexity can be actually the result of a remuneration based on stock-options
plan for CEO’s, who are usually called to design also the managerial compensation
schemes. Viewing P as a CEO who is going to negotiate contracts with lower man-
agement A is an alternative interpretation of our model. The result is then not
encouraging for stock-options plans. Aside this, with this alternative interpretation,
we can derive a possible testable implication of the model: if the managerial stock-
options are prohibitive ex-ante (i.e. the strike price is relatively high given the cur-
rent stock price) this should encourage the optionholders (CEOs) to design relatively
“‡at-wage” contracts for the management; the reverse should be true when the strike
price is actually closed to the stock price (as it is often observed). This conclusion
would then reverse one of the arguments usually in favor of using highly challenging
stock-options plans for the top management.
4.2.5 Solutions to the problem: bankers in the board of …rms.
An easy solution to the problem we have illustrated would be to appoint some repre-
sentative of the debtholders in the Board of the directors, or in any institution called
to discuss the contracts for employees. Notice that this should be true even when
the leverage is not very high, because in that case P could not internalize all the
costs of the contract and o¤er then “too expensive” remuneration schemes. For high
leveraged …rms, our proposition 1 predicts that P will not push its management to
work hard enough in order to be able to repay the debt, or at least not as hard as it
would be optimal from the debtholders’ point of view.
18The presence of banks’ representative is common when …rms are close to situa-
tions of …nancial distress, but it is not, at least in some countries, in …rms during
normal, …nancially healthy periods. Our research suggests that debtholders should
instead monitor constantly the remuneration policy whenever this latter is decided
by individuals who are also shareholders.
5 An analytical example
The analysis done in section 3 is aimed to be as general as possible17, but this has
the drawback that its implications are descriptively weak. The aim of the following
example is then complementary to section 3, i.e. to show the magnitude of the e¤ects
described up to now in a special functional framework.
Suppose the state of the world is composed by two states, fs;sg; the e¤ort choice




1 ¡ a = Pr(sja) (5)
Let the expected utility function of the agent be
E[u(ws;a)] = E[ws ¡ c(a)] = aws + (1 ¡ a)ws ¡ °a
2 (6)
while the set of contract is given by the couples fws;wsg = f¾;¾ + bg.




¾ + ab ¡ °a
2
given ¾;b










The value of the project is then
V (b) = a(ys ¡ (¾(b) + b)) + (1 ¡ a)(ys ¡ ¾(b)) (9)
and substituting for (7) and (8)






(ys ¡ ys) + ys ¡ U
17Given the constraint of the author’s ability to solve the model.
19The function V (b) is concave in b, hence the f.o.c. gives us the value of b that
maximizes the value of the project, b¤
b
¤ = ys ¡ys (10)
For notational simplicity we call y = ys and y = ys. The maximum value of the





+ y ¡ U
and P will invest in all the projects for which the date t = ¡1 payment I is lower or
equal to V ¤.
If the project has been …nanced entirely with equities all the results before go
through, since P will implement the same contract b¤ at time zero, maximizing the
value of the project.
As proved in section 3, if P has decided to issue risky debt at time t = ¡1 with
a promised repayment equal to y >> D > y the solution will be di¤erent. The value
of the project at t = 0 is just the sum of VE(b) + VD(b) with
VE(b;D) = a(b)(y ¡(¾(b) + b) ¡ D)
VD(b;D) = a(b)D + (1 ¡ a(b))(y ¡ ¾(b))
and at t = 0 P maximizes VE(b) given the functions (7) and (8). The function VE(b)












64°2 ¡48°(y ¡ D ¡ U) (11)
that puts a restriction on the cost of e¤ort for the agent, ° ¸
3
4(y ¡ D ¡ U). Notice
that the optimal bonus is a function of the promised payment D, i.e. of the leverage
at time t = ¡1. We have then veri…ed in this simple example our proposition 1, but
we now can tell more precise answer on the comparative static of the model: is b¤
D
higher or lower of b¤? Is the optimal bonus decreasing with D? Can we quantify the
agency cost of debt …nancing?
First, it is not immediately veri…ed, but it is very intuitive, that b¤
D < b¤. It is
intuitive because in this example the bonus is extremely high in the case of 100%
equity …nancement, since it results to give to A all the surplus ys¡ys in case of good
realization. Obviously, P cannot promise an higher premium.
Secondly, it is easily shown deriving (b¤
D w. r. to D) that the optimal bonus de-
crease with leverage, according to our proposition 1. The more the claims of debthold-
ers, the less P gets in any case, and hence the less he is ready to pay to A in the
good state, since most probably the payo¤ will not bene…t himself. In the particular
example here illustrated this trades o¤ the incentive for P to push A working more
in order to make his shares “in-the-money”.
Third, we can proceed backward characterizing the optimal capital structure.




20and hence the debt …nancement is more costly than the equity …nancement: since the
P’s objective is to maximize VE; the optimal policy is to issue no risky debt at all.









(D + U ¡ y) + y ¡ U (12)
and we can show three results:
1) VD(D) < D: rational debtholders anticipate the choice of optimal contract
for P given the capital structure and ask for an higher return to protect themselves
against the induced risk of default; the return on debt, D
VD(D) ¡ 1 > 0.
2) VE(b¤
D;D) + VD(b¤
D;D) < V (b¤): changing the payo¤ function for P causes an
ine¢ciency in terms of project-…nancing possibilities. All the projects whose cost
I 2 [VE(b¤
D;D)+VD(b¤
D;D);V (b¤)] are not implementable with risky debt, while they




@ b > 0: for debtholders it would be optimal to design contracts with higher
incentives.
Apart from the disclaim applicable to all the paper, about the agency cost of
outside equity (see section 4) this example is somewhat special because implies that
whenever risky debt is issued the optimal contract from the point of view of share-
holders induce less e¤ort. Proposition 1 tells us that this is not always the case. But
we can quantify the e¤ects over the return on risky debt and its agency cost, that is
necessary to proceed into an empirical investigation.
5.1 Remuneration with shares
We solve here the proposed example considering the case where the agent remuner-
ation consists of shares of the …rm, verifying our Proposition 2. The example also
allows to see when the (IR) constraint is the binding constraint, a feature that is
extremely complex to be analyzed in the more general case.
We start assuming that the project is entirely …nanced with equities, and the






where q is the quota of shares paid to A. His choice of e¤ort solves
max
a aqy + (1 ¡ a)qy ¡ °a
2






. This represents the (IC) constraint for the
optimal choice of q in the principal problem given the …rst order approach.
But from (IR) we get:
aws + (1 ¡ a)ws ¡ °a
2 ¸ U
18For simplicity we assume here no discount between t = ¡1 and t = 0.





















ay + (1 ¡a)y
¢
given aE(q);q ¸ qIR
E


















optimal choice for P is given by qIR
E . In that case the value of the …rm entirely






We analyze now the impact of a di¤erent capital structure on the value of the
…rm. Suppose D > y has been issued at time zero: given the shares-remuneration




and the e¤ort solution is then aD(q) =
qy
2°
that is higher than aE(q). It is intuitive
that now the agent puts an higher e¤ort since he enjoys a positive payment only in
the good state. But (IR) must also be satis…ed in the choice of q, hence
aws ¡ °a
2 ¸ U








19Observe that the utility of the agent increases with q, then we obtain the second constraint from
the (IR) relation (14).










° + u(a ¡b)
2
´
22Again we can solve the principal problem
max
q (1 ¡ q)aD(q)(y ¡ D)
given aD(q);q ¸ qIR
D


















°g(y ¡ y) + y
and it is easy to verify that VD ¸ VE since VD ¸
q
U
° (y ¡ y) + y and VE <
r³q
U
° (y ¡ y)
´2
+ y2.
Then, we have veri…ed the general principle illustrated before: leverage is indeed
a value-maximizing device whenever the individual who is putting the human capital
(and the e¤ort) necessary to produce payo¤s is endowed with shares of the project
(or is remunerated by them). With a remuneration scheme where the agent is not
paid with claims on the project payo¤s, risky debt creates an agency cost.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that when the …rm value depends on the result of some human
capital e¤ort that is not perfectly observable and it is then exposed to moral hazard
behaviour, the way of …nancing the …rm will a¤ect its value.
When the principal-shareholder can …nance the investment with equities or with
riskless debt, he will implement a contract which maximizes the …rm value. This
does not occur if the …rm is …nanced partially with risky debt. Then, contracts
are an additional sources of agency cost for debt …nancing. The basic intuition of
the result is that, whenever risky debt is issued, the principal does not completely
internalize the bene…ts (resp. the costs) of an higher incentive bonus (with respect to
the bonus he would propose with 100 % equity …nancement) since they are shared
with (resp. paid by) debtholders. This implies that in highly leveraged …rms we should
observe relatively “‡at” compensation schemes for the management: in that case
inside-shareholders have no incentive to pay a very high remuneration in the case of
success since they su¤er most of its cost, enjoying the bene…ts only in relatively few
contingencies. The shape of the optimal incentive scheme depends in general on the
characteristics of the probability distribution of the future payo¤s as a function of
the human e¤ort.
The result seems to contradict previouspapers (Innes(1990)) in which issuing debt
serves as commitment for the entrepreneur to work hard and maximize the value of
23the …rm. We show that the key di¤erence is due to the kind of managerial compen-
sation: when management is rewarded with shares of the …rm, leverage is actually
an useful device for implementing value-maximizing choices. We can then reconcile
some empirical evidence (Smith and Watts (1992)) that shows a negative association
between leverage and compensation when this is done via monetary payments, and
other characteristics from case studies in LBOs (Denis (1994)) in which this form of
…nancial reorganization proves much more successful in increasing operational perfor-
mance when it is linked with a reorganization of managerial compensation that focus
on share-plans.
We also present an example where the loss in ex-ante value due to risky debt
…nancement can be quanti…ed.
7 Appendix





¾ + b(ys ¡ y)
¢
g(sja)ds ¡c(a) = U

















































































@b = (ys ¡ y);
@ws









that proves the result given that u(¾) is monotone increasing. ¥
24Proof of Lemma 3. Assuming that the “…rst-order” approach holds, the solution
of the agent’s problem is characterized by the …rst order condition (2). Rewriting it
observing that ¾(b) for (IR) constraint:
Z s
s
u(¾(b) + b(ys ¡ y))ga(sja)ds ¡ c
0(a) = 0









































































g(sja) is increasing in s; and since
R s
s g(sja)ds = 1, deriving with
respect to a:
R s







Notice now that, form standard results in principal-agent literature (Holmstrom,
1977) if the agent is risk-neutral the principal is not asked to o¤er him a remuneration
scheme that insures him from bad realizations, and hence increasing the bonus will




@b + ys ¡ y)ga(sja)ds > 0.
Since ga(sja) is increasing in s we can say that the states with negative weights
ga(sja) have a lower value ws. The idea of the proof is that the e¤ort function will
still be increasing if the same happens when u0(ws)
¡
@¾
@b + ys ¡ y
¢
is substituted to ws.

























25and since we have ordinate the states
@ys








b(¾0(b) + ys ¡ y)
¥
Proof of Lemma 4. Rewrite C =
R s







































































and since a0(b) > 0 and
R s
s wsga(sja)ds > 0 because both ws and ga(sja) are increas-
ing in s; and
R s









































that is proven in the following lemma. ¥
Lemma 5. If ¡
u00(ws)










0. If A is risk-averse u0(ws) is decreasing and convex in ys. Call f(ys) = u0(ws). We
have
Cov(u
0(ws);(ys ¡ y)) = Cov(f(ys);ys)
= Eg [f(ys) ¤ ys] ¡ Eg [f(ys)]Eg [ys]
26and for convexity of f(ys) we can use Jensen’s inequality Eg [f(ys)] ¸ f(Eg[ys]). We
have a su¢cient condition for Cov(f(ys);ys) < 0 that is
Eg [f(ys) ¤ ys] ¡f(Eg[ys])Eg [ys] < 0
Call h(ys) = f(ys) ¤ ys; the above condition becomes
Eg [h(ys)] ¡h(Eg[ys]) < 0
Eg [h(ys)] < h(Eg[ys])



























and then the su¢cient condition of the text is easily derived. ¥







































































(b) + ys ¡ y)ga(sja)ds
27and the su¢cient conditions follow restricting all the terms to be negative where R s
s wsgaa(sja)ds > 0 and
R s
s (¾
0(b) + ys ¡ y)ga(sja)ds > 0 for Assumption 3. ¥
Proof of proposition 2. The proof is divided in three steps: …rst, we show that
the e¤ort of the agent a increases in his quota, q of shares, under some bounds on his
risk-aversion; secondly, we prove that the principal has to increase that quota when
leverage increases in order to satisfy the (IR) constraint of the agent; third, we show
that the value of the …rm V for a given capital structure D=E increases in the quota
earned by the agent.
First part: a0(q) ¸ 0.

































Now, following the reasoning explained in the proof of Lemma 3 and applying the













If risky debt D has been issued, now the problem, of the agent looks di¤erent,
and the F.O.C. becomes
Z s
b s
u(q(ys ¡ D))ga(sja)ds ¡ c
0(a) = 0























that is a less restrictive bound than (16).
Second part: q0(D) ¸ 0.
Take the (IR) constraint for the agent when risky debt has been issued:
Z s
b s
u(q(ys ¡ D))g(sja)ds ¡ c(a) ¸ U
and suppose it was binding. Then di¤erentiate w.r.to D
R s
b s (u0(ws)(¡q(D) + q0(D)(ys ¡D))g(sja) + u(ws)ga(sja)a0(q)q0(D))ds+
u(q(yb s ¡ D))g(b sja) db s
dD ¡ c0(a)a0(q)q0(D) = 0
and assuming that u(0) = 0 we get
R s
b s u0(ws)(¡q(D) + q0(D)(ys ¡ D))g(sja)ds+
a0(q)q0(D)[
R s
b s u(ws)ga(sja)ds ¡ c0(a)] = 0
that reduces to (by F.O.C. of agent problem)
q0(D)
R s
b s u0(ws)(ys ¡ D)g(sja)ds ¡ q(D)
R s







that is positive since u0(ws) > 0; ys ¡ D > 0 for s > b s and q(D) > 0:
Third part: q0(D) ¸ 0.


















s ysga(sja(q))ds > 0, that is true under
assumption 2.
Putting together the three results, we have that the value of the …rm increases
with leverage if the (IR) constraint of the agent is binding. ¥
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